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T

“The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”
—Ludwig Wittgenstein

he US military and our allies are currently facing challenges from adversaries employing a wide range of tactics and pursuing uncertain objectives.
Policy makers, analysts, and practitioners are grappling for terms and concepts
to apply to these challenges that convey the unique tactical and strategic aspects
of these conflicts. With these terms and concepts they formulate and evaluate
options for conducting operations, procuring equipment, and organizing the
defense establishment. Given the great importance of these choices, the utmost
care must be used in choosing accurate terms. The widespread use of the term
“irregular warfare” in official and unofficial documents is an unhelpful and
dangerous trend. This article argues that something as seemingly innocuous as
poor terminology can have serious consequences.
Confronted with tactics radically different from our own standard
tactics, analysts created a new category, “irregular warfare,” to describe the
security challenge we face. In creating a new category, they created more conceptual mischief than they resolved. “Irregular warfare” as a term conflates
tactical asymmetry with strategic difference. While the tactics employed by
the belligerents may be different, the strategic objective is the same. Suggesting
otherwise is both ahistorical and misleading.
By maintaining that wars that pit sides with vastly different tactical
systems and resources against one another is “irregular,” analysts run the risk of
making deductive and inductive errors. Deductively, analysts will fail to apply
generalized lessons and analytical frameworks to the specifics of the strategic
challenge at hand. Inductively, analysts will fail to draw generalized lessons
and place the conflict into the broader concept of warfare. Incidents of irregular warfare throughout history thus become analytical orphans, of interest to
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military history buffs but unfairly excluded from the scientific accumulation of
knowledge in strategic studies. This simultaneously weakens and limits theories
of warfare, while leaving strategists conceptually disarmed when confronted
with strategic challenges that do not fit neatly in a specific model.
Tactical asymmetries are an enduring characteristic of warfare across
three centuries. The French Republican experience with the counterrevolution in the Vendée in the 1790s displayed many of the characteristics of what
today some would call an irregular war, and was fought concurrently with the
traditional and proto-Napoleonic Wars of the Coalitions on France’s eastern
borders. The second phase of the Franco-Prussian War pitted Gambetta’s civilian Government of the National Defense against Molke’s occupying armies and
was very different from the set-piece battles of Gravelotte and Sedan in the first
phase. In the second Boer War the British had to overcome two very different
phases of Boer resistance, and develop a tactical synthesis within their army.
Strategic thinkers, even those as formidable as Moltke the Elder, were
frustrated by the apparent failure of these wars to follow the logic of warfare.
Without generalized models or concepts to draw on, strategists struggled to
formulate effective responses. Once the wars were finished, the historical and
tactical lessons of these wars were separated from the broader theoretical and
analytic study of warfare, degrading later military efforts to confront similar
challenges. As the United States military prepares to reflect on the history of
the previous decade of conflict, it is imperative that these lessons not be isolated
as an “irregular” historical curiosity, but are instead fully integrated into a
broad and flexible tactical and strategic understanding of warfare.

The Enduring Characteristic of Warfare
Clausewitz offers a blunt definition of warfare as “an act of force to
compel our enemy to do our will.”1 In his general theory chapters, he does not
discuss tactics, he does not specify that war involves uniformed combatants,
close order drill, or movement through bounded overwatch. While Clausewitz
does discuss elements of tactics in the book, these chapters have been superseded and are now read only by Clausewitz completists. The general chapters
remain on the reading lists of staff colleges and security studies programs
throughout the world.2
While civilian analysts are comfortable discussing military strategy,
tactics have become the domain of the specialist.3 Tactics represent an important intervening step between the components of raw power and military
outcomes. The components of raw power, which can include population, level
of industrialization, technological prowess, and other attributes normally considered by macro-level projects such as the Correlates of War, are insufficient
to explain military outcomes.4 Tactical systems change the way that military
power is generated from the same resource base.5 Therefore, it makes sense
that adversaries would attempt to gain advantages through adoption of tactical
systems to offset any shortfall in the raw components of military power.
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The warfare of today is irregular only because the tactics adopted by
the adversary are not identical to our own. Yet the tactics do involve the use
of lethal and nonlethal force on the soldiers and civilians of the United States
and our allies to achieve one or more political outcomes. If the adversary could
defeat allied forces in Afghanistan by using 1880 cavalry tactics, they would
use those tactics.

The Regularity of Irregular Warfare
Tactical asymmetries go back to the beginning of time. In the Bible,
David beat Goliath by using a sling-launched projectile rather than engage in
physical contact. This section provides a short overview of three wars that displayed tactical asymmetries that frustrated the side with both a more advanced
tactical system and greater resources, specifically the counterrevolution in the
Vendée, the second phase of the Franco-Prussian War, and the second Boer
War. Despite their importance and common themes, these wars have been
excluded from the contemporary canon of military theory.
The French Revolution would give birth to Napoleonic warfare and precipitate the writing of the enduring strategic treatises of Jomini and Clausewitz.
Yet within the chaos of the Revolution is a forgotten military operation prompted
by a counter revolt in the Vendée. What has been written on the Vendée is
primarily sociological, and the tactics and operations of the revolt have been
given almost no attention.6
As the Revolution widened its political goals to include a complete
refashioning of the French State, the very institution of the Catholic Church
came under violent attack. The civilians of the Vendée revolted in 1793 against
this expansion of Revolutionary goals, and took up arms in defense of the
Church, and later of the monarchy. To put down this revolt, the Republican
government sent in an army of almost 50,000. In a series of battles, detached
columns of this army were overwhelmed and destroyed by the Vendéan forces.
The Vendéans were civilians with light armament, led by some Royalist
officers and gifted amateurs. They fought dispersed in the countryside, and
would only concentrate to destroy isolated detachments of the Republican
Army. With a whole region to cover, the Republicans were continually dividing their forces to seek out the Vendéan armies in battle.7 Paddy Griffith, in
the most complete English language treatment of the military aspects of the
Vendée, argues:
There was no specific fortress to storm, no real army to capture, and
no significant economic resources upon which the Republic could
seize . . . . In this theatre the sophisticated military education of the
Revolution’s generals was found to be largely irrelevant, in a way that
was not true elsewhere.8

The momentum of the operation only shifted when the Vendéan army
changed their strategy and attempted to lay siege to the Republican city of
Nantes. Denied their normal advantages of cover, dispersion, and surprise, they
exhausted themselves and depleted their number in the siege.
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The second Republican campaign later in the year was fought very
differently. Rather than attempt to engage the now weakened Vendéan forces,
the Republicans remained concentrated and methodically burned villages,
destroyed crops, and executed civilians.9 Modern historians estimate that
anywhere from a quarter to half of the Vendéan population was killed by the
Republicans.10 Three years after it began, the uprising was put down in 1796.
Yet even then the Vendée would occasionally flare up and would require a
Republican (and later Imperial) garrison through 1815.11
The French later faced a better resourced partisan campaign on the
Iberian Peninsula, and apparently drew no links to their experience in the Vendée.
In the Peninsula War, which gave birth to the term “guerilla war,” the Spanish
partisans supported by English regulars slowly depleted French resources, and
caused the eventual withdrawal of Imperial forces from the peninsula.
The Franco-Prussian War, while best remembered for the crushing French defeat at Sedan, evolved into a complex second phase of partisan
warfare, occupation, and inconclusive military engagements. During the first
phase of the war, French armies using standard post-Napoleonic tactics engaged
Prussian armies with more advanced post-Napoleonic tactics. The Prussians
defeated the French in a series of large traditional battles, isolating a field army
at Metz, obliterating a second at Sedan, and capturing the French Emperor,
Napoleon III.12 With their armies lost and government fallen, the French suffered a decisive defeat.
Yet the war did not end with Sedan. A civil government under Leon
Gambetta emerged, organized new military units, and within a month had
another half million men under arms. The remnants of the French military,
plus armed civilians, fortified Paris and prepared for a long Prussian siege.
Giuseppe Garibaldi created an army of international volunteers, christened the
Army of the Vosges, and marched into France. Lacking the training, equipment, and drill of regular soldiers, and because French tactics had been called
into question by previous battles, these new armies did not seek to fight setpiece battles with the Prussian Army. Instead, they adopted new tactics and
dispersed across the countryside, forcing the Prussians to turn their regular
army into an occupying force. The Prussians were forced to disperse an army
of over 100,000 men to protect supply lines from partisan attacks.
In contrast to their success in set piece battles, the Prussians were continually frustrated by this stage of the war. No less a personage than Molke the
Elder began to contemplate a war of indeterminate duration that could only
end with the destruction of the civil infrastructure of France.13 The tide only
decisively turned against the French when Gambetta, looking to reverse earlier
French defeats, ordered French forces to resume conventional offensive operations against the Prussians. As they transitioned to this role, each army was
quickly routed by the Prussians, who were relieved to be fighting set piece
battles again.14
After the Franco-Prussian War, military analysts spent considerable
effort to understand why the French were so decisively beaten in the first phase
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and why both French and Prussian casualties were so high.15 Yet the successful resistance of the French in the second phase, and the Prussian inability to
gain traction against these
operations, attracted comThe tide only decisively turned
paratively little attention.
against the French when Gambetta
Those who wrote about it at
. . . ordered French forces to resume all, such as Hans Delbruck,
did so in quasi-philosophical
conventional offensive operations.
terms.16 As after the Vendée
almost a century before,
traditional operations completely dominated the military historiography of the
period.
Like the Franco-Prussian War, the second Boer War, fought between
1899 and 1902, had distinct phases, beginning with conventional battles and
later transitioning to guerilla warfare. Yet even in the conventional battles the
Boer armies displayed asymmetric tactics. The British used close order linear
formations for infantry and the arme blanche for cavalry.17 The Boer regular
units used dispersed formations for infantry and mounted infantry tactics for
their horsemen. This tactical asymmetry produced a series of defeats for the
British on both the offense and the defense for the first few months of the
war.18 With a new commander, new tactics, and many more troops the British
turned the table on the Boer, eventually destroying the regular Boer armies and
capturing the capitals of the Boer republics in 1900.
The remaining Boer regulars, augmented by volunteers but without a
central government, organized themselves in commando units, and began to
fight a mobile guerilla war in Boer territory. For the next two years the British
had to deal with Boer commando raids and pacify the countryside. The British
developed a system of small distributed fortifications (blockhouses), ran barbed
wire throughout the countryside, and eventually began destroying farmland
and civilian population centers. Civilians were rounded up and concentrated in
prison camps, called concentration camps, further depriving the Boer military
units of succor and support.19
Without a civil structure for resistance, the independent Boer units
began to surrender to the British. The British and what remained of the Boer
leadership negotiated a new civil structure, which eliminated the Boer republics but also set the groundwork for changing the British Cape Colony into the
Union of South Africa, an element of the British Commonwealth.
The second Boer War is important because the Boer presented the
British with two asymmetric challenges. In the first phase they fought for traditional objectives, including the holding and taking of specific ground, but
did so with nonstandard tactics. In the second phase they transitioned to a full
guerrilla tactical system.
In the aftermath of the second Boer War, the British military went to
great lengths to systematically reverse the tactical reforms of the war. The Boer
War was seen as an outlier, both geographically and conceptually, involving a
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weak foe without a regular military. The revised British infantry and cavalry
tactics were seen as temporary expedients, and changed back to 1899 doctrine.20 This tactical retrogression would have disastrous consequences for the
British in 1914.
In post World War II and colonial applications, these lessons were “relearned” by the French in North Africa and East Asia, and the United Kingdom
during the Malay Emergency and to some extent in Northern Ireland.21 In a
depressingly familiar pattern, the hard-learned lessons of irregular war had
to be relearned through the expenditure of blood and treasure. These lessons,
learned also by United States military and civilian leadership in Vietnam, were
relegated to near obscurity until recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan brought
a rush of thought and rediscovery in terms of military education, doctrine, and
cultural discourse.22
These historical examples show that very different military powers—
Republican France, Prussia, and Great Britain—have had to face challenges
from adversaries who used asymmetric tactics during all or part of a conflict.
In each case, the side with more traditional tactics struggled to adjust to the
challenge, and defined the challenge as outside of the scope of normal military
operations. After the war, the lessons were shunted to the side, and considered
to be applicable only to the very narrow circumstance of the specific conflict,
and not considered as part of the normal course of war.

Linguistic Imprecision and Strategic Mischaracterization
The use of the term “irregular warfare” is not simply a matter of harmless imprecision; it exerts a pernicious effect on the way that policy makers
plan for and conduct military operations, as well as on military historiography.
Military and political analysts fail to adequately and accurately learn lessons
from irregular operations and they fail to apply relevant lessons from the
broader knowledge base about military operations.
Political psychologists have shown that the terms we use to describe
issues can influence the way that we evaluate options and frame potential solutions.23 Verbal metaphors imply and cue cognitive heuristics. To modify the initial
quotation from Wittgenstein, “the choice of my language indicates the limits
of my world.” The choice to describe nontraditional tactics and operations as
“irregular” limits the ability to prepare for, and learn from, these experiences.
Irregular warfare implies a distinctness from regular warfare, reinforced
by framing irregular warfare in opposition to regular warfare. Modern US doctrine even goes so far as to pool “conventional,” “regular,” and “traditional”
warfare as “essentially synonymous.”24 This framing very clearly positions
“irregular” as something different and distinct from normal military operations.
“Irregular” implies infrequency. Yet military events that depart from
standard set piece battles are frequent throughout history and in the postNapoleonic period. Even traditional wars have theaters where nontraditional
tactics are practiced, such as Allenby’s campaign against the Ottoman Turks.
Biddle and Friedman argue that even these distinctions are blurred, as the
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tactical principles underlying asymmetric tactical systems are very similar.25
Yet “irregularity” implies something that is infrequent, abnormal, and defies
systematic study and routine processes and solutions.
In addition to frequency, “irregularity” also implies diminished importance. Because irregular wars are infrequent and abnormal, they should not
receive the same level of attention in terms of resources, training, or study, as
regular warfare. Irregular warfare thus becomes ancillary to regular warfare.
This depreciates our understanding of irregular warfare and, ironically, of
regular warfare.

Deductive Failures
The deductive failure is the inability of analysts to draw on the general
knowledge of warfare and history for recommendations and insight on the
current conflict. If the conflict is irregular, it is apart from our generalized understanding of warfare, and thus we toss out history and conceptual leverage which
might be very applicable to the problem if we just thought of it as warfare.
Some analysts have argued that there are irregular aspects to all wars.
Biddle and Friedman argue that there is a tactical continuum, and their analysis
of the 2006 Lebanon campaign shows how Hezbollah blended tactics.26 Military
analysts who rely exclusively on either pole fail to process the full effects of
Hezbollah tactics, and to the extent that Israeli tactics were designed for one
or the other pole, they were inadequate in facing the challenge of Hezbollah.
Another consequence of this deductive failure is to break the link
between war and politics. Clausewitz is very clear that war is a political act
with political objectives. Yet in irregular war, the political objectives are often
forgotten as analysts focus on the tactical challenges. Negotiated settlements
become very difficult to reach, or even propose. The military becomes a
jealous protector of its autonomy, citing tactical expediency as a reason for
avoiding civilian oversight. When confronted with continued French resistance
in 1871 and Bismarck’s demand for a negotiated settlement, Moltke wrote that
“ . . . only the military point of view counted. The political viewpoint counted
only insofar as it did not demand things that were militarily not allowable.”27
Bismarck advocated a (harsh) negotiated settlement, while Moltke wanted to
break the French civilization once and for all by destroying population centers
and farmland.28
Somewhat ironically, each incident of irregular warfare analyzed ended
with military commanders recommending courses of actions that approached
the Clausewitzian ideal type of total warfare. Having conceptually severed
the link between war and politics, the purely military solution became unrestrained destruction. The natural tension between politics and total warfare
which Clausewitz identified is disturbed, and thus there is a tendency to move
towards the extreme of total warfare.
In the case of the Vendée, the Republican armies committed deliberate
atrocities on a grand scale, going so far as to rename the region the Vengé, the
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French word for vengeance.29 Some modern historians claim that Vendée was
the first genocide among post-Enlightenment European peoples.30 During the
second phase of the Franco-Prussian War, Moltke proposed Exterminationskrieg
(war of extermination) specifically targeting civilian population and resource
centers.31 In the case of the Boer War, the British army implemented the systematic resettling of civil populations into camps and the deliberate destruction
of farmland.32

Inductive Failures
The inductive failure is the inability of theorists and analysts to link
together the specific instances of irregular warfare into a general theory, with
general lessons and characteristics. Thus any retrospective analysis tends to
be episodic, and disconnected from the more generalized theories of warfare.
Because knowledge and narrative are disconnected, the lessons fail to play a
part in the gradual accumulation of knowledge which forms the basis of social
science and strategic studies.
After each irregular war, there was a disturbing pattern of backsliding
on tactical lessons learned. The historiography of irregular wars and operations is instructive. The emergence of the Levée en masse during the French
Revolution is the cornerstone of emerging Napoleonic warfare, but the concurrent popular uprising in the Vendeé is a footnote.33 The first phase of the
Franco-Prussian war exerted influence through 1914, and yet the second phase
has been forgotten. The tactical innovation in the British Army during the
second Boer War had been obliterated ten years later.
Because these wars were viewed as irregular, there appeared to be
no harm in letting the lessons lapse, or even failing to fully document these
operations. Moreover, even when documented, these wars were not analytically
linked to “regular” wars, and thus remained merely case studies for historians, not evidence for theories of warfare. This allows the theory of “regular”
warfare to propagate and develop without the influence of “irregular” warfare.
This hurts the cumulative understanding of warfare as a whole, as “regular”
warfare studies become increasingly detached from the actual experiences of
war, while “irregular” war suffers from dramatic undertheorising.
In the case of the Boer War, the failure to incorporate specific knowledge into the general understanding of warfare was particularly damaging to
British military doctrine. The Boer clearly demonstrated that loosely grouped
infantry, operating in small groups and using the cover and concealment of the
landscape, could infiltrate prepared positions and then bring decisive lethal
force to bear. British writing from 1900 through 1914 discussed “Boer tactics,”
and often explained why they were not applicable to contemporary infantry or
cavalry tactical problems.34
The infiltration tactics developed by the Boer would later form the
basis of German Stosstrupen tactics, which would break open the static war
on the Western Front during the First World War.35 These tactics were used
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with particularly devastating effect against the British in 1918. Boer success in
defending ground, even with low force to space densities, also flummoxed the
British and confounded international military analysts.36 Yet it took the First
World War belligerents two years to begin making these tactical adjustments.
The elastic defense of strong points, rather than static defense in massed lines,
did not emerge until 1916, and open order attack did not appear until late 1917.37
The efficacy of these tactics was noted in 1902 after the second Boer War, but
they were isolated from the broader body of military tactics, and not considered
applicable to a general war in Europe.

Conclusion
The term “irregular warfare” reinforces a false and dangerous divide in
how war is thought about and planned for. The strategic aim of war, the use of
force to compel others to our will, is the same. Tactical concepts, including the
use of cover and concealment, local concentrations of force, and the avoidance
of decisive engagements, are the same. It is only the peculiar tactical systems
which vary, and which may be asymmetric.
By promoting irregular warfare, analysts set it up as something distinct
from regular warfare. Once separated, this leads to deductive and inductive
logical failures. Deductively, analysts fail to apply the general body of knowledge about warfare to the specific situation at hand. This can include the failure
to properly evaluate and manipulate political advantages, a failure to understand the political objective of an adversary, a failure to resort to previously
established tactical lessons, and to pursue tactically expedient actions which
complicate political solutions. Inductively, analysts fail to place the specific
war into the accumulated body of general knowledge about warfare. Lessons,
painfully learned through experience, are not reincorporated into the broader
understanding of warfare.
Elements of tactical asymmetry have been a critical element of warfare
from at least the French Revolution and the proto-Napoleonic period. The counterrevolution in the Vendée, the Franco-Prussian War, and the second Boer
War all saw adversaries adopt asymmetric tactics in order to achieve political
objectives, while belligerents relying on traditional tactics became increasingly
frustrated with the course of war, and developed extreme tactical solutions.
In each case, lessons failed to take root in contemporary military thinking. The Vendée was overshadowed by emerging Napoleonic warfare. The
second phase of the Franco-Prussian War provoked existential philosophical
thought, while military planners focused on the decisive traditional Prussian
victories at Sedan and Gravelotte. The second Boer War was deliberately
excised from British tactical development.
The United States is currently learning difficult tactical lessons for
which we are paying a high price. Yet if all we remember are specific tactical responses to idiosyncratic tactical challenges, we are doing ourselves a
disservice. By treating our current experience as “irregular,” and somehow
disassociated from “regular” warfare, we diminish our understanding of both.
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We risk continued surprise when adversaries change tactics. We also fail to
bring our full set of historical experience, conceptual models, and political
tools to bear on these challenges. As the US military begins to reflect on the
experience of the past ten years, it is imperative that we not lose or deemphasize
the lessons learned at such great cost.
Notes
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75.
2. Michael Handel, ed., Clausewitz and Modern Strategy (New York: Routledge, 1986).
3. The notable exception is Stephen D. Biddle. See Stephen D. Biddle, Military Power:
Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).
4. J. David Singer and Paul Diehl, ed., Measuring the Correlates of War (Ann Arbor, MI:
University of Michigan Press, 1991).
5. Biddle, Military Power.
6. Anthony James Joes, Guerilla Conflict Before the Cold War (New York: Praeger, 1996);
Anthony James Joes, Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency (Lexington,
KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2006). Charles Tilly, The Vendée: A Sociological Analysis of the
Counter-Revolution of 1793 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964).
7. Paddy Griffith, The Art of War in Revolutionary France: 1789-1802 (London: Greenhill
Books, 1998).
8. Ibid., 260.
9. Reynald Secher, A French Genocide: The Vendée (Paris: University of Notre Dame Press,
2003); Arno J. Mayer, The Furies: Violence and Terror in the French and Russian Revolutions
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000),
10. Adam Jones Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge,
2010).
11. Gwynne Lewis, The Second Vendée: The Continuity of Counter-Revolution in the Department
of the Gard, 1789-1815 (New York: Clarendon Press, 1978)
12. Michael Howard, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France 1870–1871
(New York: MacMillan, 1962); Geoffrey Wawro, The Franco-Prussian War: The German Conquest
of France in 1870–1871 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
13. Stig Forster, “Facing ‘People’s War’: Moltke the Elder and Germany’s Military Options after
1871,” Journal of Strategic Studies 10, no. 2 (1987): 209-230.
14. Robert Foley, German Strategy and the Path to Verdun: Erich von Falkenhayn and the
Development of Attrition, 1870-1916 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 14-37.
15. Azar Gat, The Development of Military Thought : The Nineteenth Century (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992).
16. Arden Bucholz, Hans Delbruck and the German Military Establishment: War Images in
Conflict (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 1985).
17. Literally, the “white arm”, this refers to the use of the lance and sword by mounted cavalry.
Douglas Haig, Cavalry Studies: Strategic and Tactical (London: Hugh Rees, 1907); Erskine Childers,
War and the Arme Blanche (London: Edward Arnold, 1910).
18. Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979).
19. S. B. Spies, Methods of Barbarism?: Roberts and Kitchener and Civilians in the Boer
Republics, January 1900 - May 1902 (Cape Town: Human & Rousseau, 1977).
20. Timothy H. E. Travers, “The Offensive and the Problem of Innovation in British Military
Thought, 1870-1915,” Journal of Contemporary History 13, no. 3 (July 1978); Timothy H. E. Travers,
“Technology, Tactics, and Morale: Jean de Bloch, the Boer War, and British Military Theory 19001914,” The Journal of Modern History 51, no. 2 (June 1979): 264-286.

Spring 2011

27

W. Alexander Vacca and Mark Davidson
21. Karl Hack, “Extracting Counterinsurgency Lessons: The Malayan Emergency and
Afghanistan,” Royal United Services Institute, Analysis and Commentary (October 13, 2009).
22. John A. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya
and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
23. Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000); Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam
Declarations of 1965 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
24. U.S. Department of the Army, Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare,
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, September 30,
2008), 1-4 to 1-5, http://www.fas.org/irp/dodir/army/fm3-05-130.pdf (last accessed June 2011). This
manual was superseded by FM 3-05 in December 2010.
25. Stephen Biddle and Jeffrey A. Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future
of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle, PA: US Army Strategic Studies
Institute, September 2008).
26. Ibid., 24.
27. Helmuth Moltke, “The Campaign of 1870-1871,” in Daniel J. Hughes, Motlke on the Art of
War: Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 39. Moltke was discussing the possibility
of bombarding Paris after Sedan and the capture of Napoleon III.
28. Howard, The Franco-Prussian War, 436-437.
29. Griffith, The Art of War in Revolutionary France.
30. Secher, A French Genocide.
31. Forster, “Facing ‘People’s War’;” Foley, German Strategy.
32. Pakenham, The Boer War.
33. Rory Muir, Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1998).
34. Field Marshall Sir John D. P. French, “Preface” in General Friedrich von Bernhardi, Cavalry
(trans. Major G. T. M. Bridges, ed. A. Hilliard) (London: George H. Doran Company, 1914); Haig,
Cavalry Studies.
35. Bruce I. Gudmundsson, “A Lesson from the Boers,” Military History Quarterly 1, no. 4
(Summer 1989); Storm Troop Tactics: Innovation in the German Army, 1914-1918 (New York:
Praeger, 1989).
36. Antulio J. Echevarria, After Clausewitz: German Military Thinkers Before the Great War
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 94-120.
37. Timothy T. Lupfer, The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Change in German Tactical Doctrine
During the First World War, Leavenworth Papers No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies
Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981).

28Parameters

